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The contractual network in the arts sector
Various flows of exchange occur in the arts sector. Some of them are mon-
etary, some real, a few are mixed, and many are quite difficult to measure.
This is due both to the relevance of metaeconomic aspects (aesthetic, cul-
tural, informational and so on) in the determination of their value, and to
the need to be based upon subjective evaluations whose reliability is not
necessarily influenced by experience, education or training.
Exchanges in the arts sector form a complex network that can be inter-
preted as a combination of different principal–agent relationships. Creative
artists exchange their works with producers and dealers, they exchange
these art objects and activities with single purchasers or large audiences,
central and local governments exchange grants or in-kind services with
creators (seldom), producers (normally) and sellers (frequently), private
corporations exchange funds with artists and institutions, individual
donors exchange their contributions with theatres and museums.
Tracking the flows that constitute a whole exchange route is important
in order to interpret the outcome of each production as resulting from the
combination of contractual power of each agent and of the system of
incentives (both legislative and conventional) exerting an impact upon their
strategies and choices.
Frameworks of exchange flows can take a recurring form in each sub-
sector of the wider arts system. For example, common agency is typical of
the performing arts market, in which the agent who sells live performances
to the audience receives funds from two principals, the public sector giving
grants of various forms, and the private sector giving sponsorships and
donations. More complex is the framework of exchange flows in the visual
arts sector, where artist, dealer, collector, critic and expert contribute to
determine the value of some painting through a system of cross-evaluation
and certification.
Each exchange occurring between agents in the arts sector is normally
characterized by difference and conflict of goals. Goals are often deter-
mined in a generic way, such as diffusion of culture, artistic education of
the new generations, preservation of cultural heritage and protection of
local/national repertoire in the performing arts. Nevertheless, they can
prove reciprocally conflicting: in many cases there is a trade-off between
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preservation of and access to heritage, between innovation and access in the
performing arts, between the appreciation of regular consumers and the
expectations of occasional ones.
The distribution of information among agents
Heterogeneity of the relevant information, and its different level of objec-
tivity, makes it the fundamental factor in conditioning the relationships
between principals and agents in the arts sector. This depends upon various
elements. First, there is a problem of certification of authenticity, which
appears to be quite strong in the visual arts, although it is not irrelevant in
the performing arts. Second, evaluation of quality – which is a multidimen-
sional factor covering technical, aesthetic, cultural and social aspects – can
prove quite controversial: evaluations of the same arts product can differ
strongly from each other or appear incompatible with each other, accord-
ing to the prevailing goal or group of goals taken into account.
Third, consumer choice is based upon largely insufficient information:
household production implies originality and uniqueness in each bundle of
goods and services created by consumers, therefore ex ante information on
quality and likely appreciation is almost impossible to attain, and ex post
information is subject to a high degree of variability according to the dimen-
sions of the informational stock previously accumulated by each consumer.
Agents endowed with private information find it convenient to produce
self-assessment of the relevant aspects such as quality of art products. A
wide proportion of the value relevant in each exchange is usually generated
by information created, processed and diffused by the agent (artist,
museum curator, theatre director and so on). Being related to metaeco-
nomic aspects and subjective assessments, such information is not easily
monitored by the principal, who finds it difficult to transform it into objec-
tive data.
The problems of adverse selection and moral hazard generated by asym-
metrical distribution of information are partially faced thanks to a system
of third party assessment of quality and other relevant characteristics of
each arts product. Experts and critics produce a great deal of information
about authenticity, quality and reliability of paintings, monuments, operas,
plays and concerts, as well as the different forms of reproduction (records,
pictures, books, videos and so on) whose complex and indefinite set pro-
vides art consumers with additional information able to increase the level
of utility derived from direct consumption.
Information and evaluations coming from these third parties can be var-
iously reliable, according to the different degree of substantial indepen-
dence enjoyed by critics and experts in relation to the main exchange flow.
In fact, they are often former artists or producers, therefore their judgement
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is likely influenced by past experience, with a high degree of subjectivity due
to the past active involvement in the economic life of the art sector.
Moreover, given the relevance of their evaluations for the determination
of the economic value of art products, collusion between agents and
critics/experts can occur, strengthening agents’ contractual power against
principals, and introducing a further bias in the outcome of such complex
exchanges.
In some exchanges, such as those occurring between the public sector
and theatres or museums, opinion polls can also exert some influence upon
principals’ choices; on the other hand, they appear to provide agents with
useful information if they intend to tune their own strategies and decisions
to market trends.
Objectives, strategies and constraints
As we noted before, the strategic choices adopted by both principals and
agents depend upon their goals and orientation. Statutes, constitutions and
mission statements usually contain long and heterogeneous lists of objec-
tives. These refer to various aspects of art production, and are charac-
terized by an inevitably low degree of precision. This extends to the
description of tools and actions to which each principal or agent formally
commits in order to pursue his goals. In this respect, strong and sound prin-
ciples often support weak and uncertain strategies.
While single goals can conflict with each other within the strategy of each
single agent, his main orientation appears to be crucial in determining
the likely outcome of each principal–agent exchange. The heterogeneous
nature of activities, the range of material and financial dimensions, the
different extent of regional competence and other factors generate a variety
of institutional structures in the arts sector.
From a juridical perspective, organizational forms can arise from various
causes; they normally share the non-profit constraint, but can adopt the
formal label of foundations, institutions or corporations, with a series of
specifications and definitions (such as the newly born ‘participation foun-
dation’ and ‘cultural society’ that enrich the Italian institutional land-
scape).
In order for their organizational orientation to be identified, the formal
label does not necessarily prove useful, though a few characteristics can be
analysed, such as the goals of price policy, the selection of inputs or the
length and breadth of product life. In the case of art producers, orientation
normally lies between the extremes of altruistic mission and revenue max-
imization; a role is played by the proportion of utility derived by ‘immate-
rial’ satisfaction, that is, utility related to the activity per se rather than to
its monetary or material implications and effects.
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In this regard, public institutions belonging to central and local govern-
ment can be either oriented towards social goals such as the diffusion of
the arts and culture or equality of access to the arts, on the one hand, or
towards typically bureaucratic goals such as consensus or rents (or some
mix of both) on the other. For their part, private companies give funds to
the arts either in search for a distinguished reputation or – at the opposite
extreme – in order to diffuse their brand name through indirect publicity.
There are cases in which the network of exchanges among the various
agents operating in the arts sector is more complex, and in which agents
of an exchange act as principals in another one, forming a sort of princi-
pal–agent chain (as in the visual arts market); this makes the analysis of the
whole picture more difficult owing to the reciprocal impact exerted by the
actual orientation of each agent.
Also limiting our view to the simple case of a theatre or a museum, we
often face a common agency relationship, in which two principals give
funds to the arts institution (their common agent) in exchange for activities
whose real nature and cultural value are completely known and evaluated
by the agent who receives the funds. The agent has therefore the possibility
to provide each of his principals with a false report about the goals actu-
ally pursued (and the impact actually exerted). The choice actually to hide
some information from one or both principals depends upon how one
party’s orientation combines with the others’.
If the agent is revenue-oriented and the principals respectively pursue
social goals (public sector) and reputation (private sector), there is the strong-
est incentive for the agent to cheat, overstating the characteristics of his
supply which appear to be consistent with these generical and unmeasurable
goals. The most efficient response on the part of each principal is then to
replace monetary grants with in-kind subsidies: since monitoring of output
appears to be ineffective, the stage of control is ‘shifted back’ to inputs.
This can contribute to the selection of mission-oriented producers who
are specifically interested, not in receiving grants, but in having a real
opportunity to produce, since in-kind subsidies actually reduce their pro-
duction costs.
The existing framework of incentives
An adequate system of incentives can substantially reduce – if not offset –
the advantages currently enjoyed by cultural institutions in this complex
principal–agent network. Unlike the case in manufacturing, incentives in
the arts sector cannot focus upon the price level or other monetary param-
eters, also owing to the controversial measurability of value, and to the exis-
tence of many (often infinite) alternative combinations of inputs, in order
to produce the artistic outcome.
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Incentives appear to be weak in most (national and local) cultural poli-
cies throughout the world. This is certainly due to bureaucratic resistance,
and to the evident convenience for the art institutions to be included on a
list of recipients, which in some way guarantees the reception of public
grants year by year. But a stronger reason for this lack of effective incen-
tives is the perception that any mechanism activating monitoring and the
consequential sanction risks impinging upon creative, artistic or cultural
freedom. Such a perception is shared by both art institutions and public
regulators, and assisted by a very strong and explicit moral sanction.
A closer look at art production should make it clear that cultural choices
and managerial strategies can be separately considered, analysed and eval-
uated. Of course there may be a ‘grey area’ in between, but certainly many
decisions and actions taken by art institutions can be the object of moni-
toring and evaluation, according to the prevailing goals of the principal.
In fact, while the choice of inputs in a performance or in an exhibition
are certainly related to artistic and cultural choices – and therefore respond
to subjective and ‘untouchable’ criteria – there are many other aspects of
art production that can be measured through rather precise parameters: the
diffusion in a certain area or the length of production, the policy aimed at
guaranteeing equality of access and its outcomes, the educational impact,
and the variety and quality of informational side-products are all parts of
art production whose monitoring does not exert any negative impact upon
the artistic and cultural choices.
The level and composition of grants can therefore be tailored to the level
and composition of art production according to a specified hierarchy of
goals and performance indicators. In such a way public grants could
abandon the uncomfortable role of financial lifebelt, becoming instead the
explicit reward for the attainment of specific goals.
An effective system of incentives could finally move art production from
the false market of grant maximization to its proper market, in which
various and heterogeneous principals ‘buy’ different parts (or effects) of the
agent’s effort, each according to his goals, values and orientation; this
would strengthen the importance of consumer choice and expectations,
and re-equilibrate the contractual power of principals and agents.
See also:
Chapter 49: Public choice; Chapter 52: Regulation.
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